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Please Enter Your Home Location: Geoprivacy
Attitudes and Personal Location Masking Strategies
of Internet Users
Dara E. Seidl,
,† Piotr Jankowski,
,‡ Keith C. Clarke,† and Atsushi Nara


Department of Geography, San Diego State University
†Department of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara
‡Institute of Geoecology and Geoinformation, Adam Mickiewicz University
Location masking, or geomasking, is a practice typically undertaken by data stewards who wish to release a
georeferenced data set without infringing on the privacy of those whose data are involved. With numerous
opportunities to transmit our personal locations through electronic devices, individuals have the agency
through masking to stem the flow of their location data or otherwise engage in obscuring their locations.
Relatively little is known about the factors that influence individuals to protect their location privacy and
the extent to which they do so. Joining a growing recognition of individual-level privacy efforts, this study
examines the predictors of personal-level location masking and the relationships among geoprivacy-related
knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. Using a probability-based sample and an open online sample from California,
this study finds that in situ personal masking behavior is consistent across demographic groups. A key attitude
influencing whether or not participants choose to mask location is trust in Web sites to protect their personal
data. Greater knowledge about how location data are transmitted and higher concern for privacy are positively
correlated with masking behavior.KeyWords: geomasking, geoprivacy, obfuscation, privacy, survey.
地点屏蔽，或是地理屏蔽，是数据管理专员为了释放标示地理的数聚集、但不侵犯数据所有者的隐私时
所採用的特定方法。通过电子设备传输我们的个人地点的机会众多，个人具有通过屏蔽来阻止其地点数
据的流动抑或是反之从事混淆其地点的能动性。影响个人保护其地点隐私、以及他们这样做的程度之因
素却相对不为人知。本研究接合对个人层级隐私之努力逐渐增加的认识，检视个人层级地点屏蔽的预测
因素，以及与地理隐私相关的知识、态度与行为之间的关系。本研究运用来自加州的一个根据或然率的
样本以及开放式网路样本，发现原地的个人屏蔽行为在各人口群体之间是一致的。影响参与者是否选择
屏蔽地点的主要态度，是信任网站保护其个人数据。对于地点数据如何传送有较多的知识，以及对隐私
的较高考量，则与屏蔽行为呈现正相关。关键词：地理蒙蔽，地理隐私，使困惑，隐私，调查。
El ocultamiento de la localizacion, o geoenmascaramiento, es una practica que tıpicamente usan los administradores
de datos que quieren liberar un conjunto de datos georreferenciados sin vulnerar la privacidad de aquellos cuya
informacion esta involucrada. Con las numerosas opciones disponibles para trasmitir nuestras localizaciones
personales a traves de aparatos electronicos, la gente puede ejercer agencia por medio del ocultamiento para
contener el flujo de sus datos de localizacion, o, de otro modo, puede actuar para oscurecer sus ubicaciones.
Relativamente poco se conoce acerca de los factores que influyen sobre los individuos en terminos de proteger su
privacidad locacional, y sobre el alcance con el que ellos lo hacen. Uniendonos al creciente reconocimiento de los
esfuerzos por asegurar la privacidad individual, este estudio examina los predictores del ocultamiento de localizacion
a nivel personal y las relaciones entre el conocimiento asociado con geoprivacidad, las actitudes y el
comportamiento. Usando una muestra basada en probabilidad y una muestra abierta online en California, este
estudio encuentra que el comportamiento de ocultamiento personal in situ es consistente a traves de los grupos
demograficos. Una actitud clave que determina si los participantes deciden o no enmascarar la localizacion es el
confiar en la proteccion de sus datos personales en sitiosWeb. Un conocimiento mas grande sobre el modo como los
datos de localizacion se trasmiten y una mayor preocupacion por la privacidad se correlacionan positivamente con la
conducta del ocultamiento. Palabras clave: geoenmascaramiento, geoprivacidad, ofuscacion, privacidad, sondeo.
Location data permeate our frequently useddigital services and are routinely bought andsold by private entities. Geographic data are collected when we swipe credit cards, browse theInternet, post on social media, and use location-based services (LBS). Such data collection and
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subsequent transmission to third parties often occur
without the knowledge or consent of the data sub-
ject. This practice is in direct opposition to the con-
cept of location privacy, or geoprivacy, which refers
to the right of individuals to control when and how
their personal location data are shared (Duckham
and Kulik 2006). Efforts to protect geoprivacy in
geographic research have primarily involved
geomasking techniques, which introduce deliberate
inaccuracy into geographic data to protect both
confidentiality and spatial distribution (Armstrong,
Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999). Applications of
geomasking are intended for releases of geographic
data and suggest a structure in which trusted experts
make decisions on the appropriate parameters to pro-
tect the privacy of individual data subjects. In this
study, we examine the reverse of this structure: a
bottom-up evaluation of the choices that individuals
make to obscure, or mask, their own locations. We
refer to the practice of obscuring one’s own location
data as personal location masking. In studying personal
location masking, we deployed an online survey to
answer two principal questions:
1. In what ways do adults attempt to mask their
location data?
2. How do geoprivacy knowledge and attitudes influence
these personal location masking behaviors?
Geoprivacy-related attitudes and behaviors merit
study not only because the traditional notion of geo-
privacy is eroding under pervasive data collection
but because this erosion leads to personal harm.
Despite the refrain that privacy is nothing to worry
about for those who have “nothing to hide” (Solove
2007), localized individual harms from unwanted
location disclosure rise with increased data collec-
tion. In 2016, a California man was sentenced to
prison for using geotagged Instagram photos to locate
and burglarize thirty-three women (Puente 2016).
Undesired location tracking is often applied in
domestic abuse cases, where abusers install spyware
on victims’ smartphones or hide Global Positioning
System (GPS) trackers in shoes or cars (Shahani
2014). Surreptitious location collection is also play-
ing out on a larger scale. In November 2017, reports
emerged that Google collected cell tower locations
when Android consumers had location services
turned off, to within a quarter-mile of accuracy
(Liao 2017). Furthermore, the conversion of location
data to a commodity can cost consumers who do not
share it. For example, the insurance practice of
offering lower rates to drivers who install vehicle
GPS devices not only leads to disparate costs of
driving depending on the neighborhood of commute
(Scism 2016) but penalizes customers who decline to
share their location (Keßler and McKenzie 2018).
Calls for protecting geoprivacy are not new.
Mid-1990s research discusses the growing threat to
privacy from geodemographics and large databases
(Goss 1995; Curry 1997). The geographic informa-
tion systems (GIS) and society debates over privacy
revived terms such as the panopticon, a symbol of
total surveillance and control (Dobson and Fisher
2007), and introduced geoslavery, where an entity
exerts control over the location of an individual
(Dobson and Fisher 2003). Today, privacy concerns
are growing. The 2014 President’s Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology issued an influ-
ential report on big data, citing location privacy as
one of the predominant issues in a data-driven world
(Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
[PCAST] 2014). In 2016, the National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC) released a National
Privacy Research Strategy, establishing goals for
federal investment, among which is measuring pri-
vacy desires and impacts (NSTC 2016). This study
is a step toward that goal. The work is also relevant
in the wake of the European Union (EU 2016)
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which
became enforceable in May 2018. The GDPR
restricts how companies collect and share personal
records, levying fines for privacy violations.
The following sections discuss the history of geo-
masking, location collection mechanisms, theoretical
underpinnings, strategies and motivations for per-
sonal location masking, and related survey research.
This is followed by a discussion of the study concep-
tualization and variables hypothesized to influence
personal location masking behavior. The Methods
section reviews the sampling and questionnaire
design, as well as the selected procedures for survey
analysis. In the Results, we present the correlates of
personal location masking, as well as its predictors in
ordinal logistic regression, concluding with a discus-
sion of the study implications.
Geomasking Techniques
An active body of research within the realm of
geoprivacy involves geomasking techniques. These
techniques displace geographic data to protect spatial
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distribution and the privacy of data subjects
(Armstrong, Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999).
Masking techniques include random and weighted ran-
dom perturbation (Kwan, Casas, and Schmitz 2004),
donut masking (Hampton et al. 2010), Gaussian per-
turbation (Zandbergen 2014), affine transformations
(Armstrong, Rushton, and Zimmerman 1999), grid
masking (Seidl, Jankowski, and Tsou 2016), Voronoi
masking (Seidl et al. 2015), location swapping (Zhang
et al. 2016), and masking based on the Military Grid
Reference System (MGRS; Clarke 2015). Similar to
geomasking is the computer science approach of obfus-
cation, which refers to a degradation of the quality of
spatial data. Obfuscation and the related concept of
differential privacy (Dwork 2006) are often studied in
the context of smartphones.
As privacy strategies, masking and obfuscation are
intended not for the average user but for an expert
behind the scenes making decisions on the accept-
able degree of location privacy. These techniques
have a typical use scenario: Geographic data
containing human subjects are set to be released and
must be altered to maintain confidentiality. In a
world where personal location disclosure does not
exist outside of these limited data releases, geomask-
ing would be effective in maintaining confidential-
ity. Internet users routinely encounter opportunities
to reveal their current and future locations, however.
Location Collection Mechanisms
Location data are constantly emitted as a by-prod-
uct of our daily technological interactions. Location
capture mechanisms include GPS, Internet Protocol
(IP) address, WiFi access points, cell tower communi-
cations, geosocial check-ins, geotagged photos, and
semantic content of social media posts. Some of these
mechanisms require input from the user (check-ins,
volunteered geographic information [VGI]), whereas
other forms of location data are passively and, often,
furtively collected. For example, there are several
ways in which smartphones continue to collect or
emit location when location services are turned off.
When searching for possible WiFi connections, WiFi-
enabled devices release signals, including a media
access control (MAC) address, which is a unique and
persistent device identifier, and the name of each
saved WiFi network to which the device previously
established a connection (Kofman 2019). These WiFi
probe requests can spell out a thorough location
history, which might include home networks, airports,
hotels, and coffee shops visited by a user.
Bluetooth serves as another positioning technology.
The proximity marketing industry employs beacons
emitting Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), such as Apple’s
iBeacon, to microlocate consumers and offer tailored
deals when they enter a retail location (Hern 2014).
Beacons register when smartphones enter and exit a
given location and provide tracking throughout retail
stores. Another smartphone technology, near-field
communication (NFC), supports mobile payment sys-
tems Apple Pay and Google Wallet and enables credit
card transactions when phones are within a few centi-
meters of a reader. Car manufacturers, including Tesla,
Audi, Mercedes-Benz, and Hyundai, are increasingly
equipping vehicles with smartphone NFC and BLE
technology as digital keys (Barry 2018; Swedberg
2019). The adoption of these technologies leads to
new and varied recipients of personal location data.
Cell tower communication is also used to capture
the locations of smartphone users. In addition to
Google’s collection of cell tower locations from
Android phones (Liao 2017), it was revealed in 2019
that AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint were selling real-
time cell tower customer locations to bounty hunters
and bail bond companies (Cox 2019). Aside from
GPS, Bluetooth, NFC, and cell tower triangulation,
location can be collected from otherwise unassuming
data points. One study demonstrated that applications
reading real-time smartphone power consumption lev-
els can successfully convert these data into location
information, as power demand increases with distance
from a cell phone tower (Michalevsky et al. 2015).
Location data have varying levels of accuracy. For
instance, smartphone GPS is typically more accurate
than cell tower triangulation and is thus sold at a
higher price by telecommunications companies
(Cox 2019). IP address geocoding, a process used to
geolocate Internet-connected devices by matching
their IP addresses to a database, suffers from inconsis-
tent accuracy. Recent reports have documented the
fallout from IP address geocoding in lost phone track-
ing applications. When a GPS position is not found,
these applications geocode IP address, and even if the
geocoding result is as broad as a city, state, or country,
the coordinates of the centroid of these administrative
regions are returned. This has led to tense encounters
between police, device owners, and unwitting residents
who happen to live at these boundary centroids in
Kansas (Hill 2016) and SouthAfrica (Hill 2019).
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Theoretical Underpinnings
From the myriad mechanisms for location data
capture and leakage, it is clear that personal data
flows cannot be reduced to a single device, platform,
or network. For this reason, Marwick and Boyd
(2014) characterized the flow of personal data as
belonging to networked information ecologies that
tend to capture and recirculate it without the aware-
ness of the original data subject. Other researchers
characterize privacy as no longer limited to disclo-
sures of personally identifying information (PII) but
as a set of “family resemblances” of persons and
information, which includes information collection,
processing, dissemination, and invasion (Solove
2007). Nissenbaum (2009) introduced the contex-
tual integrity approach, in which privacy is not the
right to control personal information but to have
the majority of your societal expectations met with
regard to your information flows.
Other privacy experts have attempted to make
sense of societal reactions to pervasive location col-
lection. Crawford (2014) described the public affect
in the wake of the 2013 Edward Snowden revela-
tions of the scale of surveillance activities by
national security agencies as one of surveillant anxi-
ety. Crawford defined this as a fear that the data we
shed simultaneously overreveal and misrepresent us.
With supporting survey research, Leszczynski (2015)
argued that the public affect is better characterized
as an “anxiety of control,” meaning that individuals
are more concerned with directing their own
personal location information flows in the midst of
feeling that such efforts might be futile. She argued
that individual response to the erosion of privacy is
at the origins of devices, applications, and services,
rather than with the practices of data capture or use
in surveillance. If the societal response to the loss of
privacy is an increasing concern with application-
level control, it is reasonable that Internet users
would attempt to stem their location data flows
through personal location masking.
Personal Location Masking
Social media applications, such as Facebook,
Twitter, and Instagram, often provide users with
some degree of control over the locations posted for
others to see, even if the companies themselves col-
lect more precise location data. Users can opt to
mask their locations by turning off location services;
using technology to reroute an IP address; providing
inaccurate home address information; limiting posts
with geographic content, such as check-ins or geo-
tagged photos; and otherwise reducing the resolution
of any geographic data provided. Swanlund and
Schuurman (2016) argued that Tor, an onion rout-
ing technology used to alter IP address, is a prime
example of resistance to geosurveillance.
Internet users might be more familiar with the
online classifieds Web site, Craigslist, as a mecha-
nism for regulating how they share location when
posting. When placing an ad, a user can populate
the fields for street, cross-street, city, state, and
postal code, as well as drag a pin around on the
map. Although intended for users to drag the pin to
a more exact location, this option could also be used
to displace the point to hide the exact location, as
with a geographical mask. Obfuscation, a recent book
by legal privacy experts Brunton and Nissenbaum
(2015), provides guidance on data masking strategies
at the individual level. As alternatives to encryption
and the use of Tor, recommendations include using
applications that flood collection technologies with
fake, misleading, or ambiguous data to obstruct and
evade surveillance. For example, the Firefox extension
TrackMeNot, obfuscates actual user Web searches by
hiding them in randomized fake search queries.
Although multiple technologies exist for Internet
users to mask their own locations, the extent to
which users employ such strategies is unknown.
Motivations for Personal Location Masking
This study focuses on personal location masking
as an act of privacy protection. Alternate considera-
tions, however, can motivate individuals to modify
location, one of which is to gain a benefit not other-
wise available. For example, some Netflix subscribers
alter IP addresses to watch content that is not avail-
able in their regions of residence, and some players
of Pokemon Go modify GPS locations to acquire
more game rewards (Zhao and Chen 2017). The
benefits of altering location data can include money,
prizes, or status. Some social media users document
“fake vacations” to expensive or exotic locales to
gain status or invite the envy of others. A company
called Fake a Vacation offers customers edited pho-
tos of themselves in Hawaii or at the Grand Canyon
for a much lower cost than an actual trip. There are
4 Seidl et al.
also cases of individuals masking their locations to
oppose the surveillance of others, rather than protect
their own privacy. In a notable 2009 example, inter-
national supporters of Iranian protestors changed
their Twitter locations to Tehran in an effort to
overwhelm Iranian government censors seeking to
find and punish actual Iranians who were sending
out antiregime messages (Terdiman 2009).
Zhao and Sui (2017) provided a summary of possi-
ble motivations for location spoofing, which they
defined as the intentional falsification of one’s actual
location. The authors proposed spoofing as a neutral
term, one that encompasses motivations as benign as
curiosity and privacy protection to as malicious as
criminal intent and cyberespionage, acknowledging
that the connotation of spoofing is traditionally nega-
tive. In the field of information security, spoofing
is characterized as a technique used to gain unauthor-
ized access through deceitful impersonation
(Whitman and Mattord 2018). We differentiate per-
sonal location masking from location spoofing in that
the goal is not necessarily to provide false location for
some gain but to make the individual’s actual loca-
tion more difficult or impossible to ascertain. Personal
location masking is more closely aligned with a col-
lection of strategies for protecting geoprivacy.
Privacy Surveys
Previous social research on privacy has most fre-
quently involved the deployment of surveys. Often,
there is a strong dichotomy between self-reported
privacy attitudes and measured privacy behaviors.
Although most individuals express concern about
their personal information privacy, few take any
steps to protect it (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004).
This finding is seconded by the recent Pew Research
Center work on privacy and security attitudes
(Madden and Rainie 2015). Part of the reason is
that the mention of the word privacy can inflate self-
reported concerns due to social desirability bias
(Ruel, Wagner, and Gillespie 2015), as respondents
might feel that privacy is important to those con-
ducting the survey. To avoid this bias, some
researchers recommend removing all mention of the
word privacy when measuring related behaviors and
attitudes (van de Garde-Perik et al. 2008).
Location privacy is much less frequently studied
than general information privacy, presenting a major
gap in the literature. Keßler and McKenzie (2018)
argued that location privacy is a special case of infor-
mation privacy, in part due to the pervasiveness of
location-collecting technology and the unforeseen
inferences that can be drawn from location. The
propensity to share location, rather than mask it, has
received some attention from researchers. A survey
of users of the Chinese social networking site
RenRen found that privacy is often in competition
with users’ motivations to disclose location (Li et al.
2013). A related study found that social influence
has a strong effect on student use of location-sharing
applications (Beldad and Citra Kusumadewi 2015).
Motivations for checking in with location on
Foursquare include safety, coordination with friends,
self-presentation, and a fondness for its gamified
aspects (Lindqvist et al. 2011).
More closely related to this study is work on pub-
lic perceptions of location privacy specifically related
to online crime mapping (Kounadi, Bowers, and
Leitner 2014). The importance that individuals
place on geoprivacy in more routine activities is still
unknown, however. Another survey (Kar, Crowsey,
and Zale 2012) examined attitudes toward location
privacy in the United States but was limited to
snowball sampling of geography students and GIS
professionals. Another survey of geography university
students found that the majority of respondents did
not contribute VGI on smartphones due to privacy
concerns (Ricker, Schuurman, and Kessler 2015). In
a more related study with university students,
Leszczynski (2015) found that 68 percent of respon-
dents paid attention to whether smartphone applica-
tions requested permission to access location, and 52
percent routinely interacted with location services
controls, enabling location services in some cases
and shutting them down in others. Outside of uni-
versity students, there is a large research gap when it
comes to public attitudes and behaviors regarding
geoprivacy. This study fills that gap by deploying a
statewide California survey examining (1) the preva-
lence of personal location masking behavior and
(2) its connection to geoprivacy-related knowledge
and attitudes.
Conceptualization
Pursuant to these goals, this study employed the
knowledge–attitudes–behavior model to explain
personal location masking by Internet users, a model
commonly used to predict human behavior in health
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and environmental studies (Morgan and Miller
2002; Levine and Strube 2012). This model
hypothesizes that an increase in knowledge about a
phenomenon causes changes in attitudes, which
accumulates into behavior change. In this case,
greater knowledge about the pervasiveness of loca-
tion collection is hypothesized as correlated with
more concerned privacy attitudes and higher levels
of personal location masking behavior. Hypothesized
background variables included education level, age,
sex, income, ethnicity, and rural location (Figure 1).
Previous work found that those with higher educa-
tion levels were more likely to support anonymous
Internet browsing (Madden and Rainie 2015), and
those with lower education were less familiar with
location privacy regulations (Kar, Crowsey, and Zale
2012). Age was another anticipated predictor; youn-
ger adults have been found more likely to support
stricter, more protective definitions of location pri-
vacy (Kounadi, Bowers, and Leitner 2014), provide
inaccurate information online (Madden and Rainie
2015), and use strategies to protect online privacy
(Yang and Liu 2014). In some studies, sex was found
not to influence privacy attitudes and behaviors, but
Kar, Crowsey, and Zale (2012) found that women
are more likely to deem it a privacy violation if a
commercial firm takes pictures of one’s home. Lower
income has been found to be significantly correlated
with lower privacy concerns (Acquisti and
Grossklags 2004). Finally, it was expected that tradi-
tionally marginalized groups would exhibit less trust
in personal information exchanges, including loca-
tion sharing. Therefore, location masking behavior
was expected to vary by ethnicity. Finally, a recent
study found that users in rural California regions
were more likely to deliberately mask location when
posting an advertisement on Craigslist (Seidl and
Allen 2016).
Intervening variables for masking behavior were
expected to include experience with identity theft,
hacking, or other privacy infringement; data industry
experience; and lower enjoyment of social media. A
recent privacy infringement was expected to result
in decreased trust and greater suspicion of data col-
lection authorities, as well as stronger support for
geoprivacy. For example, a previous negative experi-
ence in online information disclosure increases pri-
vacy concern and perceived risk in sharing on social
media (Yang and Liu 2014). Likewise, employment
in a data collection or data science industry was
expected to result in heightened knowledge of geo-
privacy issues and thus higher concern and greater
personal location masking. Examining the interven-
ing variable of social media enjoyment, Lindqvist
et al. (2011) found that users of Foursquare had few
concerns about privacy.
Methods
This study employed an online questionnaire to
measure geoprivacy attitudes and their relation to
online masking behavior. The target population was
adult Internet users in California, a state with a
strong tradition of privacy and a diversity of rural
and urban populations. California’s state constitution
promises an inalienable right to pursue and obtain
privacy, and the 2015 passage of the California
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA)
further protects digital privacy by restricting
government from accessing electronic data without a
warrant. The California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA), which goes into effect in 2020, requires
companies to inform consumers of data collected
about them and allow them to opt out of its
sale. High-speed home Internet access among
Californians is at an above-average 80.5 percent of
households, compared to the national average of
78.0 percent (File and Camille 2014), which is
helpful for an Internet-based survey. Strong practices
of Internet use in the study area were expected to
result in a higher response rate.
Questionnaire Design
A primary concern in the questionnaire design
was to avoid participant overreporting of privacy
Figure 1. Conceptual model of hypothesized predictors of
masking behavior.
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concerns and to measure personal location masking
behavior as it would take place in a routine online
setting. To avoid the response bias (Ruel, Wagner,
and Gillespie 2015) anticipated from advertising the
topic of the study as location privacy, this study used
incomplete disclosure with institutional review board
(IRB) approval and advertised the questionnaire as a
“Study of Online Information Sharing.” The word
privacy was not used until the completion of the sur-
vey, when the full purpose of the study was revealed.
Participants at this point had the opportunity to
withdraw their responses.
The primary test of location masking took place
within the first survey question. Before questionnaire
items addressing geoprivacy attitudes and behaviors,
respondents were asked to provide a home location
within the fields of street, cross-street, city, state
(prefilled for California), and ZIP code (Figure 2).
Participants could then adjust their location in a
map interface by moving a pin that was initially
placed at the geocoded home location using the
Google geocoding application programming inter-
face. This setup was designed to simulate the loca-
tion prompts involved with posting a classified
advertisement on Craigslist. Craigslist users are
encouraged to enter a location and then adjust the
point in a map interface, presumably to make any
corrections to the geocoded location. Both of these
questions were optional; participants had complete
control over how much location information to
provide and whether to move the map pin.
Respondents then indicated their level of agreement
on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to
strongly agree) to the statements, “I intentionally pro-
vided incorrect information on my home location,”
and “I intentionally moved the pin on the map away
from my home location.” The remainder of the
survey consisted of similar Likert-type items, asking
participants to respond with their level of agreement
to additional measures of geoprivacy knowledge,
attitudes, and behaviors. The survey was hosted on
the Qualtrics platform, which included encryption of
survey responses.
Sampling
The survey instrument was deployed to two
samples within California between October 2017
and March 2018. The first, a probability sample, was
drawn from an address-based sampling frame pur-
chased from Survey Sampling International (SSI), a
vendor certified to access the U.S. Postal Service
(USPS) delivery sequence file, which includes
households receiving mail at post office boxes. This
sample included 2,000 households randomly distrib-
uted throughout California and an additional 300
households within rural census tracts, as defined by
Rural–Urban Commuting Areas (RUCA) released
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Economic
Research Service 2010). This rural oversample was
designed to attenuate expected selection bias from
lower response rates in rural areas and ensure
rural subgroups were represented (Kitchin and
Tate 2013). Households in this sample were con-
tacted by an initial postal letter invitation to the
“Study of Online Information Sharing” and two
follow-up postcard reminders to complete the survey
online. Participants were incentivized with a $10
Amazon.com gift card.
The second sample was an online open sample
reached by Craigslist and paid Facebook advertising
Figure 2. Home location question with subsequent option to adjust map pin.
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targeting adult California residents. Participants in this
sample were offered a $2 Amazon.com gift card. The
online sample was expected to include different demo-
graphics than the mail sample and, in particular, be
composed of participants who would be less concerned
about privacy. Reaching multiple samples was intended
to increase the external validity of the overall survey by
increasing the sample size, ensuring that smaller sub-
groups were represented, and through comparison of
the geoprivacy attitudes and masking behavior of the
two samples (Kitchin and Tate 2013). The recruitment
materials for both samples clearly stated that this survey
was part of a university research project.
Analysis
Differences between the two samples, as well as
differences between males and females, were evalu-
ated with nonparametric Mann–Whitney U tests,
appropriate for differences between two groups
within a categorical variable (Ruel, Wagner, and
Gillespie 2015). The Kruskal–Wallis test, another
nonparametric test for a categorical input variable
with more than two groups (McCarroll 2016), was
used to test differences between reported ethnicities.
Because the majority of questionnaire items were
five-point ordinal Likert-type questions, Spearman’s
correlations were suitable for calculating significant
correlations between the background, intervening,
and outcome location masking variables (Nolan and
Heinzen 2010). Because prior privacy infringement,
geoprivacy knowledge, geoprivacy attitudes, and
masking behavior were captured by multiple items in
the questionnaire, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated
to determine whether responses demonstrated consis-
tency within these categories (Ruel, Wagner, and
Gillespie 2015). High internal consistency would
support the creation of a scale variable that would
summarize responses for these categories.
The outcome variables of location masking
included precision of home location provided (num-
bered street address to none), agreement to “provided
inaccurate home location” and “moved pin away
from home location” (strongly disagree to strongly
agree), and frequency of “use technology to alter IP
address,” “provide incorrect or misleading location
to retailers,” and “turn location services off on
smartphone” (never to very frequently). Ordinal logis-
tic regression was used to test the predictors of these
ordinal variables (O’Connell 2006). The results of
the Mann–Whitney U tests and the Spearman’s cor-
relation matrix informed selection of predictors in the
logistic regression models by helping to identify any
variables that were collinear or highly correlated with
behavior and therefore good candidates for inclusion.
To determine geographical patterns, kernel den-
sity maps of responses were created using a cell size
of 10,000m, a search radius of 15,000m, and a quar-
tic kernel. The locations used to generate the kernel
density estimations were responses from the question
asking participants to enter their home locations
geocoded using the ArcGIS World Geocoding
Service. Global and local Moran’s Is were applied as
tests of spatial autocorrelation for survey participa-
tion rates and all survey variables. These statistics
enable the detection of clusters of high masking
activity or privacy concern and help to determine
whether the survey response locations fall within
expected thresholds for sampling.
Results
There were 214 total participants in this survey,
with 113 respondents from the postal address sample
and 101 from the open online sample. The open
sample differed significantly from the mail sample in
demographics (Table 1), but knowledge and
Table 1. Demographic results for the two samples
Variable Mail sample Open sample
Mann–Whitney U
significance (p < 0.05)
Total participants 113 101
Female 55% 76% 
White 66% 55%
Completed college 69% 44% 
Somewhat or very urban 62% 56%
Median age group 45–54 25–34 
Median income tax bracket $38,00092,000 $9,00038,000 
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attitudes related to geoprivacy were strikingly consis-
tent between the samples. Overall, the open sample
was significantly more female, less educated, youn-
ger, and had lower income than the mail sample par-
ticipants in Mann–Whitney U tests (p< 0.05).
Background Variables
In the Mann–Whitney U tests, males and females
differed in just two of the outcome variables; males
were more likely to hold the privacy-protective atti-
tude that “people should have the ability to browse
the Internet completely anonymously for certain
types of activities” and the masking behavior of using
technology to alter IP address (p< 0.05).
Incidentally, males had significantly higher educa-
tion, age, and income levels than female respondents
(p< 0.05), although this is likely linked to the higher
proportion of females in the open sample, which
overall had lower education, age, and income levels.
When tested with the Kruskal–Wallis statistic,
there were no significant differences by ethnicity in
the outcome variables, with the exception of self-
reported geoprivacy knowledge. Respondents who
identified as Hispanic or Latino were significantly
more likely to agree with the statement, “I am well-
informed about the ways my location can be shared
online” than other groups. This did not translate
into any of the masking activity, because there were
no behavioral differences by ethnicity.
Geographic Distribution
Responses from the two samples were geographi-
cally distributed throughout populated California.
Figure 3 illustrates similarly distributed responses from
the two groups, with the highest densities in the San
Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, Orange County,
and San Diego. Point locations for the kernel density
were geocoded from participant input to the home
location question. The mail sample achieved a
slightly higher density in the Bay Area, whereas the
open sample had a higher density of responses in
Southern California. When tested with global
Moran’s I at a county level and normalized by popula-
tion, however, there was no spatial autocorrelation of
the response locations. This suggests that both the
mail and open samples were randomly distributed.
Geoprivacy Knowledge and Attitudes
Results by sample for geoprivacy-related knowl-
edge and attitudes were very similar (Figure 4). The
only item for which the two groups differed was
knowledge that it is possible for Web sites to collect
location using an IP address. Although both samples
Figure 3. Maps showing distribution of survey responses in California.
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Figure 4. Box plots of geoprivacy knowledge and attitudes by sample group. Significant difference between samples in a
Mann–Whitney U test. GPS ¼ Global Positioning System.
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agreed overall with this statement, which is correct,
the open sample was significantly more likely to
agree (Mann–Whitney U test, p< 0.05), demonstrat-
ing higher geoprivacy knowledge. For the rest of the
knowledge and attitudes variables, the two samples
did not differ.
Overall, participants in this study had average
knowledge of how location is transmitted and
supportive attitudes toward privacy. Fifty percent
of respondents somewhat or strongly disagreed
(correctly) that GPS is the only way location can
be collected on a smartphone, and 73 percent
agreed that it is possible for Web sites to collect
location from IP address. Agreement with “I am
well informed about the ways my location can be
shared online” was split, with 48 percent agreeing.
On average, participants who knew that IP address
transmits location were not sure whether smart-
phones collect location aside from GPS and were
not sure they were well informed about loca-
tion sharing.
The greatest variation in privacy attitudes
between participants was for the statements “The
Web sites I visit do a good job of protecting my
personal data” (34 percent somewhat or strongly
agreed) and “I support enabling GPS devices in
all motor vehicles to improve traffic applications”
(44 percent somewhat or strongly agreed).
Participants generally had more privacy-protective
attitudes, supporting anonymous Internet browsing
(73 percent in agreement) and in disagreement with
company collection of irrelevant location data in
transactions (just 8 percent in support). These results
were consistent between samples.
Personal Location Masking Behavior
Location masking behavior was present in all of
the outcome variables and in both samples (Figure 5).
A surprising proportion of respondents provided a
numbered street address with city, state, and ZIP
code, even though it was not required for the survey.
This location disclosure was made by 73 percent of
mail sample respondents and 56 percent of open sam-
ple respondents. Yet, in both samples, 15 percent of
respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that they
intentionally provided incorrect location information.
Two qualifiers were important for some of the
masking behaviors measured: interaction with
the map function for home address and smartphone
ownership. Of all respondents, 70 percent moved the
pin on the map, and 94 percent owned a smart-
phone. The mail sample respondents were signifi-
cantly more likely to interact with the map function
(Mann–Whitney U, p< 0.05), but both groups were
equally likely to have a smartphone.
For map-based location masking, 11 percent of
respondents who used the map function reported
intentionally moving the pin away from their
home locations. Of smartphone owners, 27 percent
reported often or always keeping location services
off, and 20 percent of these respondents had their
location services off at the time they took the sur-
vey. Participants also reported providing incorrect or
misleading location information to retailers (26
percent and 35 percent of mail and open sample
respondents, respectively) and sometimes using
technology to alter an IP address (9 percent and 26
percent of mail and open sample respondents). In
Mann–Whitney U tests, participants in the open
Figure 5. Percentage of participants exhibiting location masking behavior by sample group. Significant difference between samples in a
Mann–Whitney U test.
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sample were significantly more likely to provide a
lower precision home address and to use technology
to alter an IP address (Figure 5). For the other varia-
bles, respondents engaged in masking behavior at
the same rates.
Scale Variables
Given the frequency and variation in ordinal ques-
tions measuring prior privacy infringement (four
items), geoprivacy knowledge (three items), privacy
attitudes (four items), and masking behavior (six
items), the consistency of these constructs was mea-
sured using Cronbach’s alpha. In preparation for this
test, variables measuring the same concept, but in
reverse order, were recoded. For instance, responses
to “the only way location can be collected on a
smartphone is through GPS” were reversed to have
higher values indicate greater geoprivacy knowledge.
The results for geoprivacy knowledge (0.29), attitudes
(0.39), and behavior (0.42) revealed low internal
consistency and did not support the construction of
scale variables. The four items measuring previous
privacy infringement, however, were highly correlated
with each other. These included unauthorized user
access of an online account, notification of credit or
debit card fraud, identity theft experience, and infor-
mation stolen in an online hacking event. The
Cronbach’s alpha for these variables was 0.71, which
meets the threshold of 0.70 seen as adequate for com-
bining scale items (Tavakol and Dennick 2011).
Therefore, a variable for hacking experience was cre-
ated, summing the results of these four responses.
Variable Correlates
The correlation matrix from the Spearman’s cor-
relations for ordinal variables is provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Spearman’s correlation matrix for survey variables
Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 I1 I2 K1 K2 K3
B1. Education 1
B2. Age 0.36 1
B3. Income 0.48 0.38 1
B4. Urban location 0.26 0.14 0.23 1
I1. Recent hacking experience 0.21 0.35 0.19 0.19 1
I2. Social media enjoyment 20.16 20.04 20.11 0.00 20.04 1
K1. Knowledge smartphone location 0.03 20.20 20.03 0.10 0.00 0.01 1
K2. Well-informed location sharing 0.11 20.23 0.04 0.04 20.23 0.14 0.12 1
K3. Knowledge IP address location 0.04 20.14 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.12 1
A1. Believe Web sites do not protect data 0.24 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.25 20.21 0.27 20.20 0.22
A2. Against GPS in all vehicles 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06 20.24 0.08 0.03 0.02
A3. Support anonymous browsing 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12
A4. Against location collection 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.24
M1. Lowered home location precision 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.00
M2. Provided inaccurate address 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 20.23 0.06 0.06 0.08
M3. Moved pin away from home 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.00
M4. Alter IP address 0.03 20.15 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.17
M5. Give inaccurate address to retailer 0.09 20.26 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.01
M6. Turn location services off 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.01 20.20 0.06 0.02 0.04
A1 A2 A3 A4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
A1. Believe Web sites do not protect data 1
A2. Against GPS in all vehicles 0.18 1
A3. Support anonymous browsing 0.09 0.10 1
A4. Against location collection 0.17 0.17 0.20 1
M1. Lowered home location precision 0.24 0.04 0.08 0.05 1
M2. Provided inaccurate address 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.14 1
M3. Moved pin away from home 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.41 1
M4. Alter IP address 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.07 1
M5. Give inaccurate address to retailer 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.19 0.23 0.07 0.16 1
M6. Turn location services off 0.09 0.38 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.00 0.02
Notes: Significant positive correlations are shown in bold; significant negative correlations are shown in bold italics (p< 0.05). GPS ¼ Global
Positioning System.
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Variables are grouped into background (B1–4), inter-
vening (I1–2), knowledge (K1–3), attitudes (A1–4),
and masking behavior (M1–6). The background var-
iables were positively correlated with each other;
higher education was correlated with age, income,
and urban location (p< 0.05). These variables were
also positively correlated with a recent privacy
infringement or hacking experience (p< 0.05). Data
industry employment was not correlated with any
outcome variables and was therefore excluded from
Table 2. In general, geoprivacy knowledge and pri-
vacy-protective attitudes were positively correlated
with masking behavior. The surprise in these results
was K2, or self-reported knowledge of how location
is shared. This knowledge indicator was not signifi-
cantly correlated with masking behavior, but it was
negatively correlated with the belief that Web sites
do not do a good job of protecting data (0.20). In
other words, participants who believed themselves to
be well informed about how location is shared also
believed that the Web sites they visit do a good job
of protecting personal data. This K2 variable is also
negatively correlated with the hacking scale variable
(I1) with a correlation of 0.23, suggesting that a
recent privacy infringement can temper confidence
in one’s ability to manage location data. For the
other two measures of geoprivacy knowledge (K1
and K3), the relationship with the A1 variable of
trust in Web sites was the opposite. Higher knowl-
edge about how location is collected on smartphones
and through IP address was positively correlated
with a belief that Web sites do not do a good job of
protecting data (0.27 and 0.22, respectively).
The privacy attitude most correlated with other
variables was A1, the belief that Web sites do not
do a good job of protecting personal data. This con-
cerned privacy attitude was positively correlated
with age, income, recent privacy infringement,
smartphone location knowledge, and IP location
knowledge. It also had a positive correlation with
masking activity: 0.24 for lowering location preci-
sion, 0.16 for using technology to alter IP address,
and 0.15 for providing inaccurate address to retailers
(p< 0.05). A1 had a negative correlation with
enjoyment of social media and self-reported knowl-
edge of location sharing.
The correlations reveal that there is still a dichot-
omy between privacy-supportive attitudes and behav-
iors. A4, disagreement that companies should be
allowed to collect irrelevant location data, is not
correlated with any of the masking behaviors, nor is
A3, support for anonymous Internet browsing. A2,
disagreement with enabling GPS devices in all
motor vehicles, was highly and significantly corre-
lated with M6, frequency of turning off smartphone
location services (0.38), but not correlated with any
other masking activity. Enjoyment of social media, a
hypothesized intervening variable (I2), also had sig-
nificant negative correlations with masking, includ-
ing M2, providing inaccurate home address (0.23),
and M6, turning off location services (0.20).
Masking activity was also positively correlated
with itself. For instance, giving an inaccurate address
to retailers (M5) was significantly positively corre-
lated with limiting precision of home location
(0.19), providing inaccurate home location (0.23),
and using technology to alter IP address (0.16).
Turning off location services (M6) had a significant
positive correlation with moving the map pin
away from the home location (0.19). Overall, the
correlations demonstrate that each item in the
knowledge and attitudes groups captures a somewhat
different concept with complex relationships to
masking behavior.
Spatial Autocorrelation
This study also measured spatial autocorrelation
for the questionnaire items using global and local
Moran’s I. Background variables exhibiting signifi-
cant global clustering were participant-reported
urban index, data industry employment, and income.
Geoprivacy knowledge exhibited no significant
global clustering, but two privacy attitudes and one
masking behavior did (p< 0.05). Privacy-supportive
attitudes, such as lower trust in Web sites (A1) and
lower support of GPS devices in all vehicles (A2),
clustered in Berkeley and San Diego, whereas lower
concern clustered in Central Valley cities. Use of
technology to alter IP address (M4) had hot spots
north of San Francisco and clusters of low values
south near Modesto. No other masking behaviors
exhibited spatial autocorrelation and therefore their
distributions could not be distinguished from a ran-
dom distribution.
Predictors of Personal Location Masking
This section presents the results of ordinal regres-
sion models predicting the six personal location
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masking variables (Table 3). Initial development of
these models included all possible predictor variables
and was informed by the Spearman’s correlation
analysis and Mann–Whitney U tests. Models with
the lowest AIC values were selected for presentation,
whether or not predictor variables remained signifi-
cant (Harris 2016). All of the outcome masking
behaviors had relatively few remaining predictors in
their models. They also had relatively high residual
deviance values, suggesting that there are more fac-
tors at play in predicting masking behavior than are
currently captured in this study.
Factors that remained significant in predicting a
lower precision in provided address by participants
(M1) were recruitment through the online sample,
the belief that Web sites do not do a good job of
protecting personal data, and the additional anteced-
ent masking behavior of providing retailers with an
incorrect address. The behavior of giving retailers an
incorrect address (M4) was also a significant predic-
tor for the M2 model predicting provision of incor-
rect home address within the survey, as was lower
enjoyment of social media. For the M3 model pre-
dicting moving a pin away from the home location,
none of the modeled predictors remained significant,
although frequently turning off location services was
close (p¼ 0.07). The factors influencing the M3
masking behavior merit more study.
For models of masking outside the survey environ-
ment (M4–6), the background variables of sex and
age remained important predictors. Being male was a
significant predictor of M4, using technology to alter
Table 3. Ordinal regression results for personal location masking outcome variables, models with lowest AIC shown
Coefficients Value SE t Value p Value Odds ratios
M1. Limited precision of home location
Open online sample 0.895 0.318 2.816 0.005 2.447
Completed college 0.596 0.324 1.840 0.066 1.816
Believe Web sites do not do a good job of protecting personal data 0.434 0.150 2.895 0.004 1.544
Provide retailers with incorrect/misleading location data 0.425 0.157 2.700 0.007 1.530
Residual deviance: 371.93 j AIC: 387.93
M2. Provided inaccurate home location
Enjoy contributing to social media 0.500 0.195 2.563 0.010 0.606
Provide retailers with incorrect/misleading location data 0.605 0.195 3.100 0.002 1.832
Residual deviance: 243.95 j AIC: 255.95
M3. Moved pin away from home location
Male 0.796 0.607 1.312 0.190 0.451
Open online sample 0.705 0.494 1.427 0.153 2.024
Frequently turn off location services on smartphone 0.408 0.229 1.787 0.074 1.504
Residual deviance: 181.51 j AIC: 195.51
M4. Use technology to alter IP address
Male 1.042 0.348 2.995 0.003 2.835
Age 0.104 0.107 0.973 0.331 0.901
Open online sample 1.217 0.372 3.273 0.001 3.376
Know it is possible for IP address to reveal location 0.432 0.213 2.027 0.043 1.541
Believe Web sites do not do a good job of protecting personal data 0.331 0.155 2.133 0.033 1.393
Residual deviance: 322.26 j AIC: 338.26
M5. Provide incorrect or misleading address to retailers
Male 0.554 0.281 1.974 0.048 1.740
Age 0.403 0.087 4.634 0.000 0.669
Completed college 0.699 0.289 2.423 0.015 2.012
Believe Web sites do not do a good job of protecting personal data 0.221 0.131 1.681 0.093 1.247
Residual deviance: 494.25 j AIC: 510.25
M6. Frequently turn off location services
Male 0.553 0.300 1.845 0.065 0.575
Completed college 0.312 0.286 1.092 0.275 1.366
Enjoy contributing to social media 0.118 0.164 0.717 0.473 0.889
Do not support enabling GPS in all motor vehicles 0.561 0.120 4.665 0.000 1.752
Residual deviance: 473.49 j AIC: 489.49
Notes: Significant predictor variables. AIC ¼ Akaike information criterion; GPS ¼ Global Positioning System.
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an IP address, and M5, providing an incorrect
address to retailers. Age and completing college were
also significant predictors of M5. The only variable
that remained a significant predictor of M6,
frequency of turning off location services, was the
attitude of not supporting GPS in all motor vehicles.
Only one knowledge variable was a significant
predictor of masking behavior; use of technology to
alter an IP address was successfully predicted by
knowledge that an IP address transmits location.
The most consistent significant attitudinal predictor
of masking behavior was A1, the belief that Web
sites do not do a good job of protecting personal
data, which predicted M1 and M4 and remained in
the model for M5. On the whole, the knowledge
and attitude predictors of masking are closely related
to the context of the masking behavior; IP address
knowledge predicts IP masking, Web site privacy
attitudes predict online masking, and GPS attitudes
predict nonuse of location services.
Discussion
Overall, the study results indicate that individuals
across demographic groups participate in personal
location masking. There is evidence for all of the
following masking activities tested in our survey:
providing an incorrect address, limiting address
precision, moving a map pin away from the home
location, providing an incorrect address to retailers,
turning off location services, and using technology
to alter an IP address. The prevalence of location
masking ties in with Leszczynski’s (2015) concept of
“anxieties of control” describing the public’s response
to geoprivacy challenges. Personal location masking
and its demonstrated link to knowledge and attitudes
about privacy in this survey lend support to the idea
that data anxieties operate at the level of devices
and applications, or the entry points for location
collection. In addition to location collection by
networked devices, this study suggests that there
may be data control anxiety at the entry point of
manually entering a home location in text fields.
Although we did not measure respondents’ moti-
vations for turning off location services, this study
finds that 27 percent of respondents reported often
or always keeping smartphone location services off.
Our study measured this personal masking activity in
a different manner than Leszczynski’s (2015) survey
of university students, which reported that just over
half of respondents actively toggled location services
on and off. Although we have framed toggling
location services as a personal masking activity, cor-
porate and government actors continue to capture
device locations through cell tower triangulation,
WiFi probe requests, and Bluetooth. In that regard,
exercising control over data flows at the location
services level might offer protection only in that it
eliminates one of the more accurate tracking mecha-
nisms: GPS. Otherwise, there remain other compo-
nents of the linked network ecology of big data
(Marwick and Boyd 2014) with which it is possible
to capture and distribute personal location data.
Despite evidence for personal masking behavior, 73
percent of the mail sample and 56 percent of the
open sample provided the highest precision of home
location: a numbered street address with city and
ZIP code. This result differed significantly between
samples, suggesting that context has an impact on
personal location masking. Because the address-based
sample was recruited by mail, this group either recog-
nized that this project already had home address data
or had more trust in the overall study due to the
printed contact materials. Contact materials for both
samples made it evident that this was a university-
sponsored research project. Open sample participants
might have had less trust in the Internet-based adver-
tising of the survey. Another possibility is that the
lower monetary incentive offered to open sample par-
ticipants was too low to encourage participants to pro-
vide their home addresses. Open sample participants
received $2, whereas mail sample participants received
$10. This would support previous research that the
price of location privacy, measured by the minimum
compensation that participants would require to
participate in a month-long location tracking study, is
$13 (Danezis, Lewis, and Anderson 2005).
The results of this survey corroborate recent calls
for increased education on geoprivacy mechanisms as
resistance to surveillance. Swanlund and Schuurman
(2016) described how education in the technical
language of geosurveillance mechanisms is essential
to maintaining agency against them. As part of their
geoprivacy manifesto, Keßler and McKenzie (2018)
called for public education in LBS to engage users in
negotiating location privacy with service providers.
Supporting these arguments, this study finds that
geoprivacy knowledge is correlated with the masking
behaviors of limiting address precision and altering
IP address. Being male and part of the online sample
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were also significant predictors for masking IP
address. These groups are perhaps more likely to
engage with the technocratic language needed to
enact IP masking. Incidentally, the measurement of
IP masking did not test if this was due to use of a
virtual private network (VPN) for employment pur-
poses or an active strategy to hide location. Future
efforts should stress the difference between these
purposes. Although there is no guarantee that the
returned location is correct, IP address is commonly
used to look up location. It is also possible that par-
ticipants who had knowledge that an IP address can
be used to identify location found it futile to mask
location when asked for a home address or to move
a map pin. This might explain why this study did
not find correlations between education and personal
location masking.
This study used self-reported knowledge about
how location is shared as an indicator of knowledge.
The results suggest that this construct is better suited
as a measure of geoprivacy attitudes, rather than
knowledge, because it was not consistent with the
other knowledge variables. Participants who felt well
informed were not those who scored well on the
other tests of technical geoprivacy knowledge. In
addition, self-reported knowledge was positively
correlated with trust in Web sites to protect personal
data, whereas the other knowledge variables had
negative correlations with this attitude. Self-reported
knowledge was negatively correlated with a recent
hacking experience, suggesting that privacy infringe-
ment lowers confidence in one’s agency to manage
privacy. This result supports other recent findings on
low public awareness of the extent of personal data
collection (Raine 2016).
The most common masking behavior captured in
this study was the provision of incorrect or mislead-
ing address data to retailers, with 26 percent and
35 percent of mail and open sample respondents,
respectively, sometimes or often masking in this way.
This information, as well as the statistic that 15
percent of survey respondents reported giving an
incorrect address in the survey, can be helpful in
generating error estimates for future studies that
attempt to capture location. These results also
demonstrate the importance of context in personal
masking behavior. Personal location masking appears
more prevalent when the recipient of location data
is a retailer, rather than university researchers. It
is possible that respondents put more trust in the
university affiliation of the survey than with retailers
and therefore reported contributing more accurate
home locations. In related work, trust has been
reported as a main predictor of adoption of location
sharing applications (Beldad and Citra Kusumadewi
2015). Similarly, a key attitude predicting masking
behavior was the belief that Web sites do a good job
of protecting personal data. Respondents who dis-
agreed with this statement were more likely to provide
a lower precision of home address, alter IP address,
and give inaccurate address information to retailers.
In the decision to participate in personal location
masking, consumers might also be conducting a
cost–benefit analysis (Danezis, Lewis, and Anderson
2005). Internet users might divulge their locations
to obtain some benefit, such as use of a free online
service or application to search for nearby restau-
rants or directions to the nearest gas station. In a
similar vein, consumers might weigh these benefits
against the cost of compromising location privacy. It
is possible that participants in this survey varied the
precision and accuracy of their reported home loca-
tion according to anticipated benefits of completing
the survey, such as the incentive payment.
Participants might have been more likely to report a
correct and precise home address if they perceived
their gift card delivery to be contingent on correct
home address, although incentive payments were
delivered electronically. A lack of incentive pay-
ments in a new iteration of this survey might result
in greater masking activity if participants perceive
no benefit in providing a correct location.
Extensions of this survey research should also
evaluate direct motivations behind different masking
behaviors. As mentioned in the Introduction, some
Internet users alter their locations not to protect
privacy but to gain other benefits. For example,
participants in the game Pokemon Go have been
documented to spoof location to obtain game rewards
(Zhao and Chen 2017), and other motivations for
location spoofing include curiosity, research interests,
social rewards, or criminal activity (Zhao and Sui
2017). This study only asked respondents about the
frequency with which they altered their IP addresses
but not the motivations behind this activity.
This survey had the unusual property of asking
respondents to report on their honesty in providing
their home locations, both through text and by
moving a point on the map. In both the mail sample
and the open sample, 15 percent of respondents
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reported providing incorrect address information.
This calls into question whether or not respondents
provided correct information for other survey varia-
bles, such as age, income, or education level. It is possi-
ble that the survey achieved similar rates of respondent
misreporting of demographic variables, although there
was no means to test for this in the survey.
Conclusion
This study fills a major gap in the privacy litera-
ture by focusing on public attitudes and behaviors
related to geoprivacy. Most research on privacy with
human subjects fails to recognize the power of
identifying location, and studies of public attitudes
toward geoprivacy have heretofore been limited.
Although the population for this study is in
California, the methodology could be replicated in
other regions. This study finds that 15 percent of
Internet users asked to enter a home address provide
incorrect location information, and 10 percent of
those moving a pin on the map move it away from
their home locations. This masking behavior takes
place across social lines by both males and females,
across ethnic groups, and across income levels.
Furthermore, these might be underestimates of loca-
tion masking; in this study, participants had to admit
that they intentionally provided incorrect location,
because no ground truth of location was collected
from IP address. It is possible that some respondents
were unwilling to reveal that they had provided
inaccurate locations, particularly if they feared not
receiving the incentive.
A key finding of this research is that personal
location masking is linked to knowledge and atti-
tudes about geoprivacy. The belief that Web sites do
not do a good job of protecting data is significantly
correlated with three masking behaviors: lowering
location precision, altering IP address, and providing
inaccurate address to retailers. Knowledge that it is
possible for IP address to reveal location is a signifi-
cant predictor of IP address masking, and a lack of
support for GPS devices to be enabled in all motor
vehicles is a significant predictor of turning off
smartphone location services.
In highlighting the privacy protection strategies of
Internet users, this work demonstrates that despite
pervasive data collection, individuals can play a role
in protecting their location privacy. Still, personal
location masking is practiced by a minority of
Internet users in a state with a large high-technology
sector and a protected right to electronic privacy. It
is recommended that this study be extended beyond
California to capture a better sense of the prevalence
of geoprivacy attitudes and behaviors.
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